2023 Summary Report: 
The Practicalities and Politicization of American Family Life

Principal Investigators: Christopher F. Karpowitz & Jeremy C. Pope

Project Committee: Paul Edwards, Christopher F. Karpowitz, Allison Pond (Independent Project Manager), and Jeremy C. Pope

We thank our extraordinary team of research assistants, including Natalie Bria, Isabella Felin, and Margaret Fitts. We could not have completed the study without their diligent efforts.

We are deeply grateful for the efforts and advice of our advisory committee, Karlyn Bowman (American Enterprise Institute), Camille Busette (The Brookings Institution), Dan Cox (American Enterprise Institute), Richard Reeves (American Institute for Boys and Men), Isabel Sawhill (The Brookings Institution), and Brad Wilcox (AEI and The University of Virginia). As it does every year, their advice dramatically improved the survey questionnaire and informed the report. Errors, of course, are our own.
# Contents

1 Project Overview & Executive Summary 3

2 The Politicization of Marriage and its Public Support 6

3 The Most Important Problems 10
   3.1 Families ................................................................. 10
   3.2 Teens ................................................................. 16
   3.3 Fertility ............................................................... 18

4 Economic Recovery? 21

5 Social Media: Worries and “Solutions” 23

6 Education: Biases in Schools 27
   6.1 Biases in Schools .................................................... 27
   6.2 Decision-making about Books Available to Students ............................................. 30
   6.3 Sex Education ....................................................... 37

7 Moderate Abortion Attitudes 39

8 Appendix: Statement on Methodology 42

9 Appendix: Topline Report 42
1 Project Overview & Executive Summary

After nine years of fielding the American Family Survey, we have noticed that people ask us one question more often than any other. It takes varying forms, but it is always derivative of this: “How are families doing?” This is an important question because families are a basic unit of society that provides socialization for children and physical and emotional support for all its members. But the answer to this question depends on the level of abstraction. Do you mean the families that currently exist in the real world? Or do you mean The Family as an institution? For the former — families that exist in the world, whose members take our survey — the answer remains similar to past years: they’re doing pretty well. This is not to say that families do not have challenges or face difficulties. We will emphasize several of them below. But it is to say that people in families are generally happy and that the day-to-day challenges of family life in America are relatively similar regardless of political affiliation or ideology. With the obvious exceptions of those dealing with divorce and abuse (sadly common enough to need a caveat — but not so common as to define the set), people tend to report a great deal of satisfaction with their families. In this year’s survey, more than three-quarters of respondents told us they were somewhat or completely satisfied with their families, a number that far outpaces the 11% who reported being somewhat or completely dissatisfied. Put simply, family serves as a strong basis of support for most people.

But if we are talking about The Family as an institution and object of political and social evaluation, the storm clouds loom a little more strongly on the horizon. Indeed in our view, those storm clouds seem to get a little stronger every year. And, as political scientists, we cannot help but notice that the prospects for the institution of the family seem to be related to politics. A few points of political difficulty.

Support for marriage as a path to stable, committed relationships is declining among those on the left.

With a few exceptions, the right generally does not see a strong need to provide public support to families confronting economic trouble and vulnerability.

The way Americans perceive challenges facing The Family as an institution has less to do with the actual challenges families face and more to do with differences in partisan worldviews.

Despite the existence of some real areas of common ground, much of the debate about key institutions — such as schools — hinges on people’s worries over political biases.

We elaborate on these and other themes below, but as we explore a sampling of the topics from this year’s American Family Survey, we simultaneously seek to call attention to the wide divide between marriage and The Family as objects of social evaluation, on the one hand, and the practical, day-to-day experience of relationships and family life, on the other. Curiously, many of our family-related partisan divides are, if not quite mirages, focused on factors that are not central to how real families live and function in the United States.

Even in the face of substantial partisan differences, though, we see opportunities for a cross-party coalition of greater support for marriage and family. The key to these opportunities — and we will discuss this
in the very first section — is a greater attention to family as a unifying institution. In terms of the lived experiences reported by AFS respondents, many families across the political spectrum are healthy: they function as key sites of support for family members; they are generally satisfying; and they serve to strengthen the next generation. And people across the political spectrum see the key challenges of family life, including the need to find quality family time together, the stresses work places on parents, and the costs associated with raising a family, in very similar ways. This common experience of family life could unify Americans, but political divisions that are not obviously necessary are leading to gaps in support for The Family as an institution. While real families continue to be a source of strength for most Americans, their views about The Family have become increasingly politicized and divisive — little more than fodder for the political culture wars. This sort of politicization has the potential to undermine real family formation and sap possibilities for working together to strengthen the most vulnerable American families.

In the pages that follow, we will highlight a few themes of this year’s survey. Among them:

- Republicans and Democrats are united in their assessments of the challenges facing their own families, with top concerns being mental or physical health struggles and finding family time; they part ways when asked to consider the challenges facing families generally. Democrats express more concern about stress on parents and the costs of raising a family, while Republicans worry about single parenting and a decline in religious faith.

- Americans worry about the economic and structural issues facing families; they are less concerned about cultural issues than in any previous year of the AFS.

- Americans name mental health and technology as the most important problems facing teenagers today.

- Many Americans are uncertain about whether declining fertility in the United States is a positive or negative trend, though Republicans and Democrats see the issue very differently, with Republicans more likely to say declining fertility is a negative sign for the country.

- While the overall economy has recovered from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, ironically, the prevalence of individual economic crises is rising among the public — at least partly because of reduced government income support. The public also remains deeply worried about inflation, particularly if they have suffered recent crises or lack income.

- Parents have many worries about social media, but they inconsistently apply solutions and tools to a world where their kids have a great deal of access. A majority of Americans favor regulating social media companies.

- Both Republicans and Democrats worry about bias in school curriculum, especially when it comes to issues of sexuality or race. However, their concerns about the direction of the bias differ substantially.

- Americans would like the public school curriculum to focus more on practical life skills and on core topics like history, writing, and government. Democrats and Republicans have vastly different views
about how much class time should be given to issues of race, sexual orientation and gender identity, and social and emotional learning.

Republicans and Democrats strongly disagree about which books should be available in school libraries and the topics that should be required as part of the school curriculum. When it comes to the process by which those decisions should be made, most Americans prefer to empower school administrators, though conservative Republicans are outliers in preferring that parents have the final say.

There is a fairly clear consensus on the basic topics that should be taught as part of sex education. People on the political left would extend that consensus slightly beyond the basics, but most respondents are comfortable with a basic curriculum of sex education in schools.

The public continues to favor a compromise on abortion policy — and probably a compromise that is governed by national law rather than local law.

This report highlights some of the most important findings of the 2023 American Family Survey. The full survey offers a wealth of detail and a host of additional topics. We invite scholars, policymakers, and all those who are interested in public opinion about the family and Americans’ reports of their own family experiences to delve into the results.
2 The Politicization of Marriage and its Public Support

The American Family Survey is in its ninth year. There is still much to learn, but one of the conclusions we have already drawn is that the institution of the family — the most basic unit of society where children are socialized and people receive their key physical and emotional support — is increasingly politicized. This is not to say that the institution lacks support. Far from it: families remain popular and the most common form of social organization. Moreover, the practical problems families face do not differ much by partisanship. Americans on both sides of the political aisle identify similar family challenges. Despite those facts, the family as a concept and an institution lacks support in key ways — though that lack of support differs across the ideological spectrum. When an institution as critical as the family becomes a political MacGuffin, it should be cause for concern for anyone. To really aid the family, both the political left and the right will have to come together in how they think about it. A strong coalition for the family exists, but it is not likely to emerge without compromise.

Before turning directly to that politicization, understanding the lay of the land is crucial: in our data the marriage rate in the country is reportedly on the decline, while the parenting rate remains fairly constant. It is worth noting that many researchers have noted a decline in the birthrate. Our data does not contradict that; this is the reporting of survey data and it will take decades for that shift in birth rates to show up here as surveys of the general public are not the place to examine fertility trends.

![Figure 1](image)

**Figure 1:** Left panel shows the rate of reported marital status in 2015 and 2023 at the time of the survey. Right panel shows the reported status of being a parent (of any age child) in 2015 and 2023. For both calculations the rate is for those 25 years of age or older.

Rather, what we take to be the basic story is that the rate of marriage is declining consistently across all groups while the rate of parenting (currently) remains fairly consistent. This may not be an entirely stable situation, particularly because support for marriage as an institution — among the same set of groups — is largely unchanged. The graph below is easily divided into three groups: a Republican, church-going group that is clearly more approving of marriage; a Democratic, non-church-going group that is less approving; and an odd collection of change in the middle.
Figure 2: The figure displays approval of marriage based on a battery of questions (see the footnote) consistently asked between 2015 and 2023. Positive and negative responses about marriage are rescaled from a 1-7 scale onto a 0-1 scale with the midpoint of neutrality preserved. Thus higher values represent more positive views of marriage with lower values representing more negative views and the arrows denoting the overall direction of change since 2015. The figure can thus be seen as a representation of the rate of change in approval of marriage for the history of the AFS.

Republicans clearly like marriage, and increasingly approve of it just as much as they did several years ago, more if they go to church. Approval of marriage thus codes as being somewhat on the “right.” The bottom two lines on the graph support this since a negative view of marriage seems to code as on “the left.” Partisanship seems to be driving this, though we leave some of the gory social science correlations aside for this audience.¹

It is perhaps the middle groups that merit the most attention and interest (for now). Blacks, those without a college degree, pure independents, lower income respondents, and Hispanics have all grown in their support of marriage as an institution. The two groups that have cooled, and dramatically, are those making

¹As an offer of proof, we note that the averages of the question about marriage being “more of a burden than a benefit” are stronger with partisanship than they are with religion when we look within both categories simultaneously. For instance, among Republicans who go to church once a week or more the agreement with that statement averages only 1.91, while Democrats who go to church once a week or more average 3.20 on the scale, a far higher number.
more than $120,000 and those who have a college degree (two groups, we note, who seem to be realigning towards the Democratic Party).

In a sense, one could argue that all of this is a decidedly mixed bag. Support is up in some places. It is down elsewhere. Perhaps all is well. Yet when you combine the implications of these first three charts, several patterns emerge.

Marriage Weakening as a Support to Children

The clear implication of the first set of charts is that children are less and less often protected and cared for by two parents. For all of the demographic groups we examined, the experience of marriage is down. We will not take the trouble to argue here (though there are a wealth of studies out there to do so) that marriage is good for people and children. See, for instance, Melissa Kearney’s recent book, *The Two-Parent Privilege*. We simply note that the experience of this survey is to show that marriage is in some slow decline, but children remain as abundant in American lives as they ever have.

Democrats Losing Faith in a Key Institution

The political left is clearly souring on marriage as an institution. Many regard it as more of a burden than a benefit to people. And this declining support has occurred despite the fact that the nature of marriage as an institution has moved in the direction favored by liberals. In recent years, for example, marriage has been reformed to become more inclusive to gay and lesbian citizens, but this has not averted a decline in faith in the institution on the left.

Republicans and the Privileged Pulling up Stakes

One could take these graphs and argue that the Republicans simply are the pro-marriage party, and in some ways that is true. But it is also true that Republicans are the most hesitant to support marriage and families with government spending. Consider some of our recent findings from 2022.

While half of Democrats wanted child tax credit payments to continue for families, just 16% of Republicans favored that policy.

Just 5% of Democrats opposed any kind of family support (creating institutions or direct payments), while 30% of Republicans opposed such support.

And when asked whether or not to pass a bill in Congress to provide additional assistance for families, 55% of Democrats believed that was “very important” while only 19% of Republicans agreed.

Republicans favor families as an institution, but they are currently unwilling to commit public resources to the families that see themselves as struggling. Note that this opposition comes even as families report struggles and problems (see the economic crises section below).

---

*To be abundantly clear, we are not arguing that all marriages and families are good and healthy. Many are so troubled and difficult that no one would argue they should continue. We note that the institution is good for most people, most of the time — an average effect, not a universal one.*
The politicization problem is, in some ways, quite simple to explain. Republicans argue that marriage is important, but they are far less willing to support families through government spending. Democrats express support for public spending that supports families and children, but they have decided to leave arguably the most important institutional support for children off of their agenda: marriage. A true coalition for families is lurking out there, but it requires our key factions to give up some of their prejudices. Republicans would have to admit that what we support financially is a key measure of what we truly value. Democrats would have to admit that marriage is a positive good for people and children.
3 The Most Important Problems

3.1 Families

Americans, regardless of partisan affiliation, are united in their assessments of the challenges facing their own families; they part ways when asked to consider families generally.

With that background in mind, we turn to Americans themselves to tell us about the challenges facing families. This year, we introduced a new approach to understanding public opinion about the important challenges facing American families today. We randomly assigned 2,000 AFS respondents to a new set of 15 potential family challenges, allowing them to choose up to three. We asked half of these respondents to identify the most important challenges facing your family today and the other half to identify the challenges facing families today. Thus, one randomly chosen set of respondents focused on their own families, while the other considered the challenges of American families more broadly.

The new curated list of potential challenges introduces a variety of new potential family concerns, including mental or physical health struggles, tensions or disagreements between family members, parents’ lack of commitment to each other, and violence and abuse within the family. Most importantly, this new approach allows us to distinguish between the concerns family members have about their own families and the concerns they have about the health of the American family more broadly. We have reason to believe that this distinction might matter. For example, when we asked 2023 AFS respondents who have been in a committed relationship for two more years to assess the health of their own marriages or relationships, only about 7% said that relationship has become weaker over the past two years, while 45% judged that it is becoming stronger. Conversely, when those same respondents were asked to assess the health of marriage generally in the United States, about 38% told us it is becoming weaker, compared to 7% who assess it is becoming stronger. In previous years, we asked similar questions about the health of American families and found a similar divide between respondents’ assessments of their own family and their beliefs about families generally.

Figure 3 presents the concerns respondents had about their own families, arranged by the percentage choosing each category. The results are striking. The top five challenges include mental or physical health struggles (chosen by 29% of respondents), difficulty finding quality family time (23%), high work demands and stress on parents (22.6%), the costs associated with raising a family (22%), and tensions or disagreements between family members (20%). At the other end of the spectrum, respondents prompted to think about the challenges of their own families tended to express less concern about violence and abuse (5%), lack of educational opportunities (5%), sexual permissiveness and infidelity (5%), single-parenthood and its effects on children (5%), and the availability of drugs and alcohol (6%).

With a few exceptions, we find more agreement than disagreement across different demographic groups in these assessments. For example, men and women tended to see things very similarly; no gendered difference exceeded 3 percentage points. Respondents making over $80,000 per year were much more
likely than respondents with incomes under $40,000 to highlight high work demands and stress on parents (36% vs. 13%), the costs associated with raising a family (26% vs. 19%), and difficulty finding quality family time (27% vs. 21%) as key challenges. Low income respondents, by contrast, tended to focus more on the lack of good jobs or wages (19% vs. 11%) and tensions or disagreements between family members (23% vs. 17%).

These differences aside, a great deal of common ground exists between Americans of different backgrounds and identities in their concerns about their own families. Perhaps most strikingly, we find remarkable agreement across the political parties about these concerns. Democrats were more likely than Republicans to choose mental or physical health struggles (32% vs. 23%) and tension or disagreement between family members (24% vs. 15%). But mental or physical health struggles were still the third most likely category to be chosen by Republicans. Conversely, Republicans were more likely than Democrats to identify a lack of religious faith or church attendance and crime and other threats to personal safety (15% vs. 5% in both cases) as important.

When we ask about families generally, however, respondent judgments displayed a somewhat different pattern as Figure 4 demonstrates. The top five concerns for families generally included the costs associated with raising a family (33%); social media, video games, and other electronic resources (27%); high work demands and stress on parents (27%); children growing up without two parents in the home (24%); and
Figure 4: Most Important Challenges Facing Families Generally

mental or physical health struggles (20%).

Figure 5 highlights the difference between the “your family” and the “families generally” conditions. Blue points to the right of the dashed red line indicate greater concern among respondents assigned to answer about their family, while green points to the left of the zero line indicate greater concern among those asked to focus on families generally. Notably, mental or physical health challenges and difficulty finding quality family time together loomed much larger among respondents asked to think about their own families. Conversely, respondents assigned to the “families generally” condition were much more likely to express concern about children growing up without two parents in the home, the costs associated with raising a family, and parents’ lack of commitment to each other. The nearly 20-point difference in concern about children growing up without two parents in the home is especially striking. Americans see single-parent homes as a problem for the nation, but not for their own families.

Even more notably, where we tended to find relatively small partisan differences in respondents’ views of the challenges facing their own families, the partisan divides are substantially larger among respondents asked to think about families generally.

Figure 6 highlights these disparities. Again, the dashed red line indicates no partisan differences. Blue points to the right of the line are those categories where more Democrats than Republicans expressed
Figure 5: Differences in the Concerns about Your Family vs. Families Generally. Blue points to the right of the zero line were chosen by a larger percentage of respondents in the “your family” condition, while green points to the left of the zero line indicate that a larger percentage of respondents in the “families generally” condition chose the item. Purple points indicate little difference between Democrats and Republicans. The pastel-colored circles are the partisan differences for respondents assigned to the “your family” condition, and the darker triangles represent the “families generally” condition. For every category but two (crime and other threats to personal safety and tensions or disagreement between family members), the partisan divides are greater — and often substantially greater — in the “families generally” condition. Note how most of the circles are a light shade of purple, indicating small partisan gaps. For example, where we find no partisan differences in concern about high work demands and stress on parents in the “your family” condition (large percentages of both Republicans and Democrats identified it as a challenge for their families), Democrats in the “families generally” condition expressed substantially more worry than Republicans about this economic stress. Conversely, very few Democrats or Republicans expressed concern about the challenge of single parenthood in their own homes, but much larger percentages of Republicans than Democrats said it was a challenge for families generally. We find similar disparities in global vs. personal judgments across lines of religion and income.
In other words, there is far more agreement than disagreement across party, religion, and income in respondents’ assessments of their own familial challenges. When asked to reflect on the experience of their own family life, Republicans and Democrats mostly identify similar problems and difficulties. But when they consider the state of the American family more broadly, this consensus evaporates. Partisans focus on different sets of challenges and concerns, and the divide between the parties tends to be substantially larger. This is not to say that either Republicans or Democrats are wrong to be concerned about any of these issues; it is, rather, that their views of the American family — but not their concerns about their own families — are refracted through partisan lenses.

**Figure 6: Partisan Differences in Judgments about Family Challenges**

Americans worry about economics and structural issues facing families; they are less concerned about cultural issues than in any previous year of the AFS.

Since its inception in 2015, a consistent aim of the American Family Survey has been to assess Americans’ views of the most important challenges facing families today. Traditionally, we have done this by pre-
senting respondents with a curated list of twelve items and asking them to choose up to three. We then categorize responses into sets of structural, economic, and cultural issues. Respondents see only the items, not our categorizations.

Structural items included things like parents not teaching or disciplining their children sufficiently (chosen by nearly 44% of respondents who received this question in 2023), more children growing up in single-parent homes (25%), the challenge of finding quality time with family in the digital age (23%), or changes in the definition of marriage and family (13%). Cultural issues included items like the decline in religious faith and church attendance (20%), the widespread availability of drugs and alcohol (15%), crime and other threats to personal safety (13%), and sexual permissiveness in society (12%). Economic issues involved the costs associated with raising a family (41%), high work demands and stress on parents (31%), a lack of government programs to support family (14%), and the lack of good jobs (11%, which is the lowest level recorded by the AFS). Because respondents could choose up to three items, these categories are not mutually exclusive.

![Figure 7: Most Important Problem Categories Over Time](chart.png)

In 2023, 1,000 AFS respondents were randomly assigned to receive the traditional question in addition to
the 2,000 respondents who received the new questions analyzed above. As Figure 7 shows, the patterns this year mirror trends we have since recently. About three-quarters of respondents selected at least one problem in the “structural” category, led by concern about how parents discipline their children. This percentage is slightly higher than the COVID years, but still below the levels seen in the first four years of the AFS. Over time, we have seen a steady increase in concern about economic pressures, and this continued in 2023, led by worries about the costs involved in raising a family. Notably, this increase in economic anxiety occurred despite the fact that worries about a lack of good jobs was lower than in any previous AFS and 10 percentage points lower than in 2015. Less than half of respondents identified cultural issues as a key concern, the lowest levels we have ever recorded and more than 20 percentage points lower than in the first year of the AFS.

3.2 Teens

Americans worry most about mental health and technology as the most important problems facing teenagers today.

In this year’s survey, we also gave respondents an opportunity to reflect on the “most important problems facing teens today.” Similar to our work on the challenges facing families, we presented respondents with a curated list of 15 items and asked them to choose three. This question was asked of all respondents, whether parents of teens or not. Results can be seen in Figure 8.

Two worries stand out: teen mental health, including suicidality, and overuse of technology, which were chosen by about 4 in 10 survey respondents. A second set of substantial concerns include bullying, pressure to use drugs or alcohol, family breakdown/divorce, and poor-quality schools. At the opposite end of the spectrum, substantially fewer respondents identified work opportunities, abuse, pornography, or decisions about sexual activity as among the most important issues facing teens. Both respondents who are currently parenting teens and those who are not expressed relatively similar views: differences between parents and non-parents of teens never differed by much more than 5 percentage points.

Men and women also generally agreed in their assessments, with three exceptions. Women expressed substantially more concern than men about teen mental health (46% vs. 34%) and somewhat more concern about bullying (32.5% vs. 25.6%). Men, on the other hand, worried more than women about teens struggling with poor-quality schools (23% vs. 15%).

Other demographic differences also mattered for assessments about the problems facing American teens today, though largely in expected ways. For example, respondents who said religion was “very important” to them tended to express greater concern than those for whom religion was “not important at all” about social issues such as the availability of pornography (14% vs. 5%), pressure to use drugs or alcohol (30% vs. 18%), and family breakdown (31% vs. 13%). Less religious respondents, by contrast, were much more likely to focus on mental health and suicidality (48% vs. 32%), though substantial percentages of religious respondents also identified this as a concern.
As with the most important challenges facing families, Americans also view teen problems through the lens of partisanship. For this analysis, we restrict our analysis to the 195 Democratic respondents and 134 Republican respondents who reported currently being a parent of a teenager (defined as having a child between the ages of 12 and 19). Partisan dynamics in the full sample are largely similar, but this analytical choice allows us to focus on those who are closest to today’s teens.

Figure 9 highlights the partisan differences. Small differences are indicated with purple, and the bigger the partisan difference, the more red or blue the points become. Though there are many issues parents on both sides of the aisle assess fairly similarly, from bullying and the importance of friendships and peer relationships to the availability of pornography, Republicans and Democrats also disagree about the importance of other issues. For example, Democrats are substantially more concerned than Republicans about the pressure to succeed, mental health, difficulties in family relationships, and navigating sexual identity. Republican parents, on the other hand, are more concerned than Democrats about overuse of technology, poor quality schools, family breakdown/divorce, and teen decisions about sexual activity. Again, these differences should not be interpreted to mean that parents on one side of the aisle or the
other do not care about these issues. For example, mental health was chosen by 3 in 10 Republican parents, making it their second most chosen teen issue (after overuse of technology). However, an even larger percentage of Democrats identified mental health as one of the most important issues facing teens today, meaning that the relative weight that Democratic parents place on teen mental health is even greater.

3.3 Fertility

Many Americans are uncertain about whether declining fertility in the United States is a positive or negative trend, though Republicans and Democrats see the issue very differently.

One potential demographic challenge related to families is the nation’s declining fertility rate. Demographers and experts on the family have written a great deal about this issue, but we know little about how
Americans themselves feel about it — do they think this is a positive or a negative trend?

![Fertility rate: children per woman](image.png)

**Figure 10:** As the chart above shows, the fertility rate in the United States has been declining in recent years. Researchers disagree about whether this decline is a good thing or a bad thing for the nation. What about you? Do you think that the decline in fertility is a positive or negative sign for the nation?

We explored Americans’ attitudes about fertility rates by presenting them with data on fertility rates from the United Nations. As seen in Figure 10, fertility rates have declined in the United States over the past decade, though the steepest declines occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s. We told respondents that researchers disagree about the implications of these trends and asked them to share their own assessment (exact question wording is seen beneath the figure). Half of the respondents received a graph with the trend line for the United States only, and half received both the U.S. and world trend lines. The presence of a comparison point with world data made very little difference to the outcome, so we combine both conditions for purposes of analysis.

On the whole, Americans express a great deal of uncertainty about declining fertility rates. While many Americans have no doubt thought about whether they themselves should become a parent, they seem to have given far less consideration to fertility rates in the nation as a whole. In the full sample, about 38% said they were unsure whether it was a good thing or a bad thing for the nation. This is the modal category. Nearly as many — 37.5% — said they thought declining fertility was a negative sign for the nation, and the remaining group — just over a quarter of respondents — judged declining fertility to be a positive sign. Parental status makes little difference to the result: both parents and non-parents express similar attitudes. We also find little evidence that attitudes differ by age.
However, we do find evidence that men and women differ in their assessments. Men were just over 10 percentage points more likely to think that declining fertility is a negative sign for the nation (43% vs. 32%), while women were more likely than men to express ambivalence (44% of women said they were unsure, compared to 32% of men).

![Figure 11: Is the decline in fertility a positive or negative sign for the nation?](image)

Partisan attachments also matter a great deal for views of declining fertility, as can be seen in Figure 11. More than 4 in 10 Democrats and Independents said they were unsure about the implications of declining fertility, compared to about 3 in 10 Republicans. By contrast, 55% of Republicans said that declining fertility is a negative sign for the nation — more than double the percentage of Democrats (27%). Conversely, Democrats were more than twice as likely as Republicans to assess declining fertility as a positive sign for the nation (32% vs. 15%).

Future work could assess what different considerations Democrats and Republicans may have in mind when asked to make these judgments, but for now, it is clear that a large percentage of Americans simply have not thought much about the issue or have conflicting considerations that lead them to feel uncertain or ambivalent. When it comes to the challenges facing American families today, the largest group of Americans is best described as unsure about whether declining fertility is something to worry about or not.
4 Economic Recovery?

Since the initial shock to the economy from the COVID pandemic, most economic indicators have recovered. Counter-intuitively, however, personal economic crises are on the rise — perhaps because of reduced government income support. Connected to lurking economic worries is inflation — something the public remains deeply worried about, particularly if they have suffered recent crises or lack income.

The world has exited the COVID crisis — though the virus disturbingly hangs around and continues to cause sickness and even death in the elderly — but the governments of the world are no longer supporting people’s income in the way that they once did at the outset of the pandemic. This context is probably necessary for understanding this figure where we tabulate the number of people who experienced a personal economic crisis in the past year, broken out by income level. Counter-intuitively, individual economic crises dipped during the pandemic. Those individual crises have almost returned to their pre-pandemic levels and it is fair to say that half of Americans with an income under $40,000 per year are experiencing such crises right now.

Incidentally, this is not an area where there are meaningful partisan divisions in life experiences. In 2023, 35% of Democrats experienced a crisis, 30% of Republicans, and just under 40% of Independents did. When it comes to the need to confront difficult personal economic challenges, unity prevails.

Part of that worry is that concern over inflation is still deeply felt, especially in downscale parts of the economy. About six in ten persons in the bottom third of the income scale (making less than $40,000) are very worried about inflation. Only four in ten of those making more than $100,000 feel this way. For points of comparison the 2023 numbers for low-income folks on other economic worries are much lower: 36% are worried about the national debt, 32% are worried about unemployment and 39% are worried about lack of government assistance.

Moreover, crises and income clearly interact. In the bottom portion of the table we can see that the vast majority of those who have experienced an economic crisis in the last year are very worried about inflation. Among the relatively less well off, the worries abate somewhat — but still a full half of those in the bottom There is a warning in these data.

Elected officials and other observers sometimes talk as if worries over inflation have abated. Although the measures of inflation are generally headed in the right direction, public concern about inflation has not dried up — especially for those with fewer resources. When columnists like Paul Krugman say, “the war on inflation is over. We won at very little cost”4, he is not reflecting what lower-income, or even average Americans, believe.

---

3The list includes: didn’t eat because you couldn’t afford food; didn’t pay the full amount of an important bill; borrow or receive money from friends or family to pay bills; move in with others due to financial problems; stayed in a place not normally meant for housing; needed to see a doctor but couldn’t because of the cost; or none of the above.

4See texttthttps://twitter.com/paulkrugman/status/171249431704246761
Figure 12: The figure displays the proportion who claimed to have experienced any of the economic crises.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income / Crisis Status</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;$40,000</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$40,000 - 100,000</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;$100,000</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced an Economic Crisis</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not Experience an Economic Crisis</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income under $40,000 &amp; an Economic Crisis</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income under $40,000 but no Economic Crisis</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Cells indicate the percentage who are “very worried” about inflation by the described category.
5 Social Media: Worries and “Solutions”

Parents have many worries about social media, but they only inconsistently apply solutions and tools to a world where their kids have a great deal of access.

Parents are generally concerned about their children’s access to and experience on social media. The figure shows the percentage of parents concerned — by level of concern — who are concerned about what their children (ages 10 - 18) see and post on social media. Strikingly, there is not a vast difference between the level of concern over what children post and what they see, though concern over posting is somewhat less common.

Figure 13: Figure represents the percentage of parents for children (age 10 - 18) who are concerned about what their children see and post on social media.
This level of concern must be contrasted with the fact that the experience of social media for this group of children is essentially universal. When asked, what apps do your children have access to, parents responded that their kids have access mostly to Instagram, Tiktok, Youtube, Facebook, and Snapchat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Platform</th>
<th>Percentage with Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instagram</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TikTok</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YouTube</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snapchat</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twitter</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinterest</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BeReal</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2:* Cells indicate the percentage of parents with children (age 10-18) who report their children have access to each social media platform.

So what percentage of teens have access to at least one of these apps? Among parents of children between 10 and 18 in our sample, 96% indicated their children have access to at least one of them — the experience is universal.

Though we examined many demographic differences, the sample size of parents of children 10 - 18 was small enough that we could not find many correlations. Though there is some evidence that higher income families are denying access to the apps, most kids, most of the time have access to a great deal of social media. And as the figure shows, people do worry. But, as the figure also shows, they don’t know what to do about it.

While the overwhelming majority of the public is quite sympathetic to some form of government regulations, the actual amount of local regulation occurring is only about half or even one-third as large. This represents, in our view, a very diffuse opinion. People want something to happen, but they do not necessarily know what it is that they truly want or they lack the capacity to implement it.

In fact, even the basic worries do not match up well to the restrictions. For instance parents who claim to worry about something often do not impose the restriction on their children.

26% of the parents who worried about online predators placed any contact restrictions on their children.

36% of the parents who worried about time spent online placed any time restrictions on their children.

28% of the parents who worried about inappropriate content online placed any content restrictions on their children.
And 35% of the parents who worried about cybersecurity and phishing required a private account.

We investigated gender differences, but found essentially no consistent differences. Parents of teenage boys (but not girls) worried about inappropriate content 72% of the time. That was at the same level as did parents of girls (but not boys): 82%. That difference may seem large, but with the relatively small sample sizes we would be reluctant to draw a strong conclusion. Levels of concern about all areas were similar.

Indeed, experienced survey researchers might look through this data and reasonably conclude there is a great deal of randomness going on between the stated worries and the actual restrictions parents place on
their children. Parents are unsure if social media companies should be sued (38% reported favoring this, with no meaningful partisan, gender, or racial differences), but nearly 7 out of 10 parents say they want the government to do something. Some might suggest that parents’ stated preference for government regulation diverges from their revealed preferences because they are not taking advantage of available parental controls. Others might see in this randomness a lack of parental capability and know-how.

This is not to say that government could not do something that would be popular or useful. Parents are clearly concerned. For instance, 66% of parents claimed to follow their children, 48% claimed to have the username and password to their child’s account and 47% claimed to check their child’s social media account at least once a week. But this concern does not appear to coalesce into something terribly consistent and clear. While it may be the case that parents are overwhelmed by the situation and want help, it is not the case that parents are consistently taking available actions right now.
6 Education: Biases in Schools

6.1 Biases in Schools

Both Republicans and Democrats worry about bias in school curriculum, though their concerns about the direction of the bias differ.

In various states around the nation, parents and elected officials have expressed concern about the potential for bias in the school curriculum. We asked all 2023 AFS respondents to share their levels of concern about local schools teaching various topics in a biased or incomplete way. About two-thirds of respondents said they were “somewhat” or “very” worried about how LGBTQ+ content might be taught in their local schools, and more than 6 in 10 expressed similar levels of worry about sex education and instruction about racism and the nation’s history of race relations. Nearly as many also expressed concerns about how local teachers might handle issues of abuse or the problem of suicide. Comparatively fewer respondents registered misgivings about how the scientific method of writing quality essays might be taught, though it is notable that more than one-third of respondents named these topics.

Figure 15: How worried are you that your local schools would teach each of the topics below in a biased or incomplete way? (Percent choosing “very” or “somewhat” worried.)

Figure 15 disaggregates these findings by partisanship. In every case, Republicans expressed more concern...
about their local school curriculum than other respondents, and at times, the partisan differences are large: a 24 percentage-point difference in concern about teaching LGBTQ+ content and a 14 percentage-point difference in worries about sex education, for example. At the same time, though, concern about bias in the teaching of LGBTQ+ content, sex education, issues of race, various forms of abuse, and suicide exceeded 50% among all partisan identities, including Democrats and Independents. (Though not shown in the figure, Independents tend to fall somewhere between Republicans and Democrats, as expected.)

While both Republicans and Democrats worry about bias, the direction of those curricular concerns differs sharply by partisanship. For example, more than 6 in 10 Republicans and Democrats expressed concern about biased teaching about racism and the nation’s history of race relations, but when we asked respondents whether schools should teach about the history of racism in the United States, more than 8 in 10 Democrats said yes, compared to less than half of Republicans (see Figure 16 for details). By contrast, less than 5% of Democrats disagreed with those teachings, compared to more than one-quarter of Republicans.

![Figure 16: Schools should teach about the history of racism in the United States.](image)

Responses were nearly identical among both Black (85% agree, 3% disagree) and White (84% agree, 5% disagree) Democrats. Among Republicans, less than a majority (45%) of White respondents agreed about the need to teach about the nation’s history of racism, while 26% disagreed. We have few Black Republicans in our sample (N = 46), but among this group, 61% agreed, while 12% disagreed. Thus, the differences in preferences about how schools should approach race are largely about partisanship, though
there is a racial divide within the Republican party, too.

In a separate set of questions, more than three-quarters of Democrats said that public schools should actively teach students to reject racism or include students of different races, compared to just over half of Republicans. And nearly two-thirds of Republicans, compared to one-quarter of Democrats, said that questions of race and racial identity should be left to parents, not taught at school.

We can find evidence in the 2023 AFS of some agreement across partisan lines about race — very few Democrats (11%) or Republicans (16%) opposed the prospect of schools teaching “that there has been significant progress towards racial equality in the United States,” for example — but partisans clearly differ in their willingness to engage the nation’s fraught history of race and racism in the classroom.

One interpretation of these findings, then, is that Democrats worry that the potential bias in school curriculum involves not engaging sufficiently with the legacy of racism, while Republicans express discomfort about telling what they see as a negative story about the nation’s past, over-emphasizing issues of race, or giving insufficient attention to racial progress. A meaningful portion of Republicans, it seems, would prefer that schools get out of the business of teaching about race entirely.

Americans would like the public school curriculum to be more focused on practical life skills and on core topics like history, writing, and government. Democrats and Republicans have vastly different views about how much class time should be given to issues of race, sexual orientation and gender identity, and social and emotional learning.

If they are concerned about potential biases, what would Americans like to see the schools emphasize? We asked respondents to indicate whether schools today spend too much, the right amount, or too little time teaching a variety of topics. As seen in Table 3, about 7 in 10 Americans would prefer schools to spend more time on practical life skills. This is a clear priority for a large number of Americans. Near majorities reported their belief that children should spend more time learning history, writing, and government, and around 4 in 10 said that schools should spend more time on social and emotional learning, art and music, science, and racial issues. Math and science are the only two issues where more respondents said schools are spending the right amount rather than too little time. Sexual orientation and gender identity are the only issues a plurality of respondents want the schools to de-emphasize: more respondents thought the schools spend too much time on those issues rather than too little or the right amount.

Once again, however, Democrats and Republicans express quite different curricular priorities, especially around issues of race and sexual orientation. As shown in Figure 17, Democrats were dramatically more likely than Republicans to report that schools spend too little time focusing on racial issues (58.3% vs. 15.5%), on issues related to sexual orientation and gender identity (38.5% vs. 7.8%), and on social and emotional learning (52.8% vs. 29.3%). By contrast, Republicans were more likely than Democrats to prioritize more time spent on traditional academic topics like math (50.4% vs. 27%), writing (56.5% vs. 43.5%), history (57.2% vs. 44.7%), and science (47% vs. 35.9%). These partisan differences tend to be
Table 3: Do you think schools today spend too much, the right amount, or too little time teaching about the following topics?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Too Little</th>
<th>Right Amount</th>
<th>Too Much</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practical Life Skills</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Emotional Learning</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art and Music</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Issues</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

much larger than gender differences or differences between parents who are more actively involved in the schools and those who have less contact with schools (with the exception that less involved parents are 15 percentage points more likely to think that the curriculum doesn’t spend enough time on practical life skills).

While concerns about bias in the curriculum and preferences for different curricular priorities abound, parents actively opting out of what schools are teaching is rare. We asked parents if they have ever removed their child from any aspect of the school curriculum for any reason. Only 13% of parents said yes. Of those who have, the most common opt-out topic was sex education, named by 4 in 10 opting-out parents; no other aspect, including gym, discussions of religion, biology and evolution, discussions of race, or English and literature courses, came close. When asked why they removed their children from discussions of sex education, the most common reasons given were concerns about inappropriate content (74% of parents who removed their children from sex ed), a preference for addressing the issue at home (65%), and lack of confidence in the school curriculum (49%).

6.2 Decision-making about Books Available to Students

Republicans and Democrats strongly disagree about the books that should be available in school libraries or the topics that should be required as part of the school curriculum.

Many states and school districts are currently dealing with concerns about the content of books in the school library and in school curricula, though it appears that a large number of the complaints and other challenges to books come from a small number of people.

We asked respondents to the 2023 AFS to tell us whether various book topics should be required reading as part of the curriculum, available in the school library but not required, or not available in schools at all.
Figure 17: Partisan differences in percentage reporting that schools spend “too little” time on each topic.

Half the respondents were randomly assigned to consider these issues in the context of middle schools, and the other half were assigned to think about high schools. The distinction between middle school and high school made little difference, except in the case of books with sexual content, where respondents were somewhat more likely to believe that such content should be restricted for middle school students (48%) than for high school students (40%). Because the differences in the two contexts tended to be quite small, we combine them for purposes of analysis here.

Figure 18 presents the results. Dark gray bars show the percentage of respondents who believe books with each type of content should not be available in schools, light green bars reflect the percentage of respondents who believe the content should be available but not required, and dark green bars represent the percentage who believe the content should be a required part of the curriculum. For every category but sexual content, a majority of respondents said the books should be available in the library but not required. No topic garners majority support as a required element of the curriculum, though books discussing the nation’s history of race and racism, books highlighting American patriotism, and books discussing women’s rights and feminism come closest.

For most topics, Americans have little appetite for completely banning books from school libraries. At least 8 in 10 Americans or more believe that books with topics like American patriotism, the nation’s history
of race and racism, women’s rights and feminism, science fiction and fantasy, and religious scriptures should be available to middle school and high school students in some form. At the same time, more than one-third of respondents said that books with gay and lesbian characters, with transgender characters, or about gender identity should not be available to students in public schools. Substantial percentages of Americans also advocated eliminating books with some vulgarity and violence or with sexual content from school libraries.

Not surprisingly, given our findings to this point, deep party differences exist in judgments about what books should be available in schools. Figure 19 presents the difference between Republicans and Democrats in the percentages saying that each book topic should not be available. Comparatively speaking, Democrats were more likely than Republicans to say that religious scriptures should not be available, though three in four Democrats reported that they should be available in some form (compared to close to 9 in 10 Republicans). Partisans generally agreed about books regarding patriotism, sci-fi and fantasy themes, the nation’s
history of race and racism, and women’s rights and feminism. The largest gulf in perspectives emerged for issues often associated with the culture wars: the role of vulgarity and violence, sexual content, and LGBTQ+ concerns. On these issues, the partisan gaps are dramatic — in the case of gender identity, for example, nearly 50 percentage points. Republicans are simply much more likely than Democrats to prefer eliminating these themes from the school curriculum or school library holdings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>More Republicans Concerned</th>
<th>More Democrats Concerned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discuss gender identity</td>
<td>-49</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include transgender characters</td>
<td>-44</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include gay and lesbian characters</td>
<td>-37</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include sexual content</td>
<td>-35</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include some vulgarity and violence</td>
<td>-23</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss women’s rights and feminism</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss the nation's history of race and racism</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlight American patriotism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious scriptures</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 19:** Partisan differences in percentage reporting that books with each topic should not be available in schools.

Partisan differences dwarf other divides. For example, differences between the preferences of men and women never exceeded 15 percentage points, though women were more hesitant than men to endorse schools including books with vulgarity and violence or with sexual content. Similarly, we find little difference between parents with school-age children who have contacted their school in the last year and those who have not made such contact. What differences do exist tend to lean in the direction of less involved parents being more willing to remove certain topics or themes from school holdings. But again, these differences never exceeded 15 percentage points, compared to the 20-, 30-, 40, and nearly 50-point
differences between Republicans and Democrats.

In general, parents who are more involved in their schools (that is, who have contacted the school in the past year) were much more likely to agree that “teachers and administrators in the public schools in my area share my values (50% vs. 30%). More so, differences in rates of parental contact with schools are not related to partisanship: both Republican and Democratic parents reported similar levels of involvement in their children’s schools (64% of Democrats and 58% of Republicans told us they had contact with the schools in the last year). For example, more involved parents were slightly more likely to agree that “it is important for public school libraries to have books that represent a variety of perspectives about political issues, even if it makes some people uncomfortable” (63% to 56%), but that 7-point difference is dwarfed by the 31-point difference between Democrats (78%) and Republicans (47%) in levels of agreement with that same question.

The 2023 AFS also included a question that focused specifically on content that schools might include as part of the required curriculum. We asked about various topics that might be controversial, and respondents could indicate at what grade level it might be appropriate for such content to be part of the curriculum. Respondents could also indicate that such content should never be required for any grade level. Table 4 presents the percentage of Democrats and Republicans who indicated the content would never be appropriate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diverse family structures, including same-sex parents</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>-37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexually explicit scenes/sexual references</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>-34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References to suicide or self-harm</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>-19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characters who use profanity or crude language</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>-19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References to sexual/physical/emotional abuse</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>-18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenes involving drugs and alcohol use</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>-17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racism and the nation’s history of race relations</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>-14.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Is it appropriate for students to read books or other materials that include the following content as part of the required curriculum? (Percentage indicating it is never appropriate.)

Again, the partisan differences are dramatic. The smallest difference — content about racism and the nation’s history of race relations — was 14 percentage points, and when it comes to diverse family structures or sexual references, the partisan differences substantially exceeded 30 percentage points, with a majority of Republicans reporting that such content should never be required in schools. Even among those who thought the content should be part of the curriculum, Republicans and Democrats disagreed about the grade levels when such content might be best shared. For example, 42% of Democrats told us that books or other material about racism and the nation’s history of race relations should be required for students in elementary school (somewhere between 1st and 5th grade). This was the modal response. Republicans who thought such material should be required tended to prefer it come much later. Only 20% reported that it would be appropriate in elementary school; instead the modal response for Republicans was middle
school or junior high (6th through 8th grade). On average, the partisan differences in timing for discussions of race and racism was about two academic years (between 5th and 6th grade for Democrats and between 7th and 8th grade for Republicans).

Amid all their disagreements about school curricula, one potential point of agreement between Republicans and Democrats concerns whether school children should read classic literature that includes language that some may find offensive. We asked respondents whether students should read the original version of such work or updated versions that remove the offensive language. Majorities of both Democrats (54%) and Republicans (58%) said that school-aged children should read the original versions of such works of literature. While it is possible that partisans disagree about their reasons for such a conclusion, neither group is strongly in favor of abandoning classic literature, even if its language violates contemporary norms.

Most Americans prefer that school administrators make decisions about controversial books in school libraries, though conservative Republicans prefer that parents have the final say.

Given that Americans are clearly divided in their preferences about school curricula and school library holdings, we also asked 2023 AFS respondents to tell us about their preferences for how decisions about these controversial issues should be made.

One important finding, given the high activity rates of a small number of people who challenge school library holdings, is that Americans tend to resist the notion that the objection of one parent is sufficient to ban books from school libraries. When asked whether they agree or disagree with the idea that “if any parent objects to a book in a public school library, that book should be removed, even if other parents like the book,” only about 15% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed, meaning that 85% disagreed or had no opinion. And this is one place where Republicans and Democrats are aligned: 16% of Democrats agreed, compared to 15% of Republicans. More involved parents were somewhat more likely than less involved parents to say that a single objection is sufficient (30% vs. 13%), but substantial majorities of all groups preferred a process that involved more than one parental objection.

We followed up with a question that offered a wide variety of different options for “who should have the final say about whether a book should stay, be removed, or be moved to a different place within the school library” when complaints arise. Respondents could choose between a committee of parents, a variety of schoolteachers and administrators (classroom teachers, the school’s librarian, school administrators, or the school board), or the state government. On average among all respondents, a strong majority (56%) preferred that decisions about book banning should be made by schoolteachers and administrators. Just over one-third preferred to empower a committee of parents, and very few (9%) wanted the state government to be the final decision-maker.

Figure 20 presents the results disaggregated by party and ideology. We include both party and ideology because the combination of both highlights a clear outlier group. Among Democrats, whether liberal
or moderate, overwhelming majorities — between 8 out of 10 or close to 7 out of 10 — preferred that decisions about book banning rest with teachers and administrators. Among independents and moderate Republicans, solid majorities also wanted school officials to make decisions, though about one-third wanted to empower a committee of parents. Among conservative Republicans, though, the overwhelming preference was for parents to make the decision. Nearly 7 in 10 preferred that option.

![Figure 20](chart.png)

**Figure 20:** When a complaint is made about a book, who should have the final say about whether a book should stay, be removed, or be moved to a different place within the school library?

When complaints arise, then, parents generally want schoolteachers and administrators to make choices about books in school libraries. But conservative Republicans are a clear outlier on this issue. They prefer to empower parents directly over school administrators, teachers, and school board members.
6.3 Sex Education

There is a fairly clear consensus on the basic topics that should be taught as part of sex education. People on the political left would extend that consensus slightly beyond the basics, but most respondents are comfortable with a basic curriculum of sex education in schools.

The key things that people want in the school sex education curriculum are as follows: personal hygiene, disease prevention, healthy relationships, human anatomy and development and family planning and contraception. These are areas of clear consensus. Beyond those basics, however, the subject matter does not garner majority support.

The political left would go further. For instance, Democrats favor adding sexual orientation and consent in romantic relationships to the school curriculum. They also represent the margin that produces a majority for family planning and contraception which pure independents and Republicans do not favor at majority levels. But beyond these small discrepancies there is largely agreement on what a useful sex education curriculum would look like.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Hygiene</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease Prevention</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy Relationships</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Anatomy and Development</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Planning and Contraception</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consent in Romantic Relationships</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstinence</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Orientation</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits of Marriage</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Identity</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects of Pornography</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masturbation</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Satisfaction</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Education Should Not be Taught in Schools</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Cells indicate the percentage who responded affirmatively to this question: "What should be a part of a comprehensive sex education curriculum in public schools? Check all that apply.". Entries where the percentage was greater than 50 are bolded.

Above we noted that the benefits of marriage are perhaps less widely appreciated on the political left than on the right. This table does reflect that as well, to a degree. Just a quarter of Democrats would insert such things into the school curriculum (slightly more independents would). But even among Republicans only 42% responded that this should be part of the curriculum.
Perhaps the most surprising result was that consent garnered only 50 percent support overall (49.75 if we extend to decimal places). We surmise that the idea of healthy relationships (broadly supported) covered this idea. It is also possible that people were concerned about how the topic would be broached (see some of the above material on bias in schools).

Overall the agreement is fairly strong here and extends to the demographic groups that one would expect being associated with partisanship. Relatively few people want such topics as gender identity, pornography and other matters to be included in the sex ed classes, though consistent with our findings on the school curriculum more generally, Democrats are much more supportive of teaching gender identity than Republicans.
7 Moderate Abortion Attitudes

The public continues to favor a compromise on abortion policy — and probably a compromise that is governed by national law rather than local law.

![Bar chart showing approval percentages for abortion by trimester for Democrats and Republicans.](image)

**Figure 21:** Different states are debating when, if at all, abortion should be legal during a woman’s pregnancy. A normal pregnancy could go up to as many as 40 weeks. Until what point in a pregnancy do you think a woman should be legally allowed to obtain an abortion? The figure collapses results into trimesters.

While it is true that a minority of Republicans favor restricting abortion to zero weeks (31%), the far more common belief is that the line should be placed somewhere in the first trimester: 47% would put it at late as this. An additional 20% would put the line for legal abortions in the second trimester or later. This is a fairly conservative view, but it is clear that the majority of Republicans favor an abortion regime that permits abortions well into a pregnancy.

---

5 Incidentally, 4% of Democrats also favor this line.

6 Of Republicans who favor allowing abortion at all, the majority favor allowing the option for at least 10 weeks or more.
Admittedly, Democrats are less restrictive. The plurality — 37% — would place the line somewhere in the 2nd trimester (13 - 26 weeks of a pregnancy). An additional 37% would put it at either zero weeks or in the first trimester (33%). Relatively few Democrats want the line of restriction to be later than that. Fifteen percent would put it in the first trimester and 12% would essentially place it at birth.

These numbers reflect a near national consensus that abortion should be permitted up to somewhere between around 12 - 18 weeks. In fact, a supermajority — 68% — would place the limit for legal abortions in either the first or second trimester.

We would not claim that the issue is easy or that a solution is near. Decades of legal debate are unlikely to be settled quickly. Feelings about the practice can be quite intense. Twenty-six percent of the public believes that abortion is murder and is “equivalent to killing a person who has already been born.” Another 10% believe that it is murder but is not the equivalent of taking the life of someone already born. And many people do want to see prosecutions: 39% would prosecute a doctor for an abortion; 30% would prosecute the woman receiving the abortion; and 22% would prosecute those paying for the procedure. But the flipside of these statistics is that criminalization is clearly not popular at majority levels for anyone involved.

For one thing, a solution of a line around 15 weeks is not likely to satisfy activists on either side of the issue. For another, the question of which level of government gets to set this policy remains live. But in terms of mass public opinion today, neither extreme — 0 weeks or 40 weeks — comes close to majority support. Generally, the public wants to support mothers: 75% of the public favor “access to affordable healthcare that would cover the cost of prenatal care, checkups, screening for medical conditions, postpartum care for pregnant women” and the partisan differences on this while significant are not enormous. Even among strong Republicans, nearly two out of three (63%) favor such policies.

Attitudes about which level of government — state or federal — should make abortion policy are largely unchanged between 2022 (the first survey taken since the Dobbs decision came down) and the 2023 survey. Most respondents favor a national policy (62%) — though that attitude is far more pronounced on the Democratic side of the aisle where 77% of Strong Democrats feel that way, as do 76% of weak and leaning Democrats. The Republican numbers are much lower (45% for Strong Republicans and 43% for weak and leaning Republicans). The question did not permit people to create a national floor or ceiling and then let states adjust in their favored direction (though we have little doubt that is what most people prefer).

These results are not driven by other demographics. For instance, 60% of whites and 63% of Blacks favor abortion being decided with a single national policy. Sixty-three percent of women and 61% of men feel similarly. And the income differences are similarly never more than a couple of percentage points. The bottom line is that public opinion remains a constant factor in the debate. A compromise that would preserve the right to an abortion but restrict it somewhere after about week 12 is perfectly acceptable to a broad swath of not only the public, but both political parties.

This will, of course, not exhaust the issue. For example, the public tends to be split on questions of insurance and this year’s results show that the public is pretty evenly split on questions of who will pay
Figure 22: Regardless of whether you favor or oppose abortion, which of the following do you prefer?

for pills (52% favoring individuals and 48% favoring insurance companies).

Other difficulties lay ahead. The issue will remain fraught as it works its way through the democratic process. But there is no reason to believe that Americans cannot find a legislative compromise on the core questions of abortion.
8 Appendix: Statement on Methodology

YouGov interviewed 3044 respondents who were then matched down to a sample of 3000 to produce the final dataset. The respondents were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, and education. The sampling frame is a politically representative "modeled frame" of US adults, based upon the American Community Survey (ACS) public use microdata file, public voter file records, the 2020 Current Population Survey (CPS) Voting and Registration supplements, the 2020 National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll, and the 2020 CES surveys, including demographics and 2020 presidential vote.

The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of education, region, own/rent residence, and Presidential vote choice. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to these deciles.

The weights were then post-stratified on 2020 Presidential vote choice, and a four-way stratification of gender, age (4-categories), race (4-categories), and education (4-categories), to produce the final weight.

The survey was fielded August 3-15, 2023 and has a margin of error of ±2.1%.

9 Appendix: Topline Report

What follows is a topline report of all survey questions asked in the 2023 American Family Survey. This topline report was generated by YouGov. Any questions about the survey or the topline should be directed to BYU’s Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy (csed@byu.edu).