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The biggest threat to China is China, dealing with their own youth, managing a generation that has only seen the pie get bigger every year.

The Middle East is at war with itself more than it is at war with us. There is no reason to expect, that it’s going to calm down.

Ordered liberty is the name of the game in the United States, and throughout our history, with very few exceptions, we have adhered to it.
The mission of the Wheatley Institution is to enhance the academic climate and scholarly reputation of BYU, and to enrich faculty and student experiences, by contributing recognized scholarship that lifts society by preserving and strengthening its core institutions. The following lectures were sponsored by the Wheatley Institution for this purpose.

For full recordings and transcriptions of these abridged lectures, please visit wheatley.byu.edu.

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The David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies is a cosponsor on all international affair events held at The Wheatley Institution.

The Wheatley Institution recognizes student editor Kristen Cardon and designer Troy Tessem for their work on this issue of the Observer.

We are pleased to publish this spring issue of the Wheatley Observer, providing digest versions of important speeches given at the Wheatley Institution. The sharing of scholarly work in this format is intended to raise awareness of international issues and subjects that merit the attention of the BYU community. The articles herein contain insights from an impressive array of scholars and public servants who have recently shared their insights on matters ranging from Europe’s financial crisis to education reform and the theology of art. A short essay on faith-based diplomacy addresses the topic that will serve as the focus of the 2014 Wheatley International Affairs Conference (WIAC).

Dr. John Hamre explains that many of our main challenges are transnational and require cooperation to be addressed effectively. Europe is key to such cooperation, and the continued well-being of the EU is thus fundamental to maintaining a global system based on Western values. Dr. Seyyed Hossein Nasr underscores the close connection that exists between truth and beauty in the art of all faith traditions. He cites calligraphy and architecture as the peak expressions of Islamic art, which he describes as a “silent theology” more eloquent than speech. Mr David Cornejo Chinguel’s short piece, based on the model of a thriving private university in Peru, is an eloquent statement for educational reform. He describes sustainable educational reform as culturally inclusive, economically relevant and faithful to core spiritual values. Professor Robert Keohane speaks of the historic tradition of the Western study of politics, but appeals for active involvement of younger minds for political science to remain vibrant and valuable to the public good. Looking ahead to WIAC, Dr. Douglas Johnston of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy highlights the use of spiritual ideas and values to challenge extremist religious ideology.

We also include summaries of less recent presentations by leaders in scholarship and public service whose words continue to shed light on important issues of concern. CSIS’s Ralph Cossa gives a comprehensive and still-current overview of US cooperation with Asian allies and its strategic significance. Gen. John Abizaid, speaking just prior to the outbreak of the Arab spring, states presciently that Middle East instability stems from it being a region “at war with itself.” Judge William Webster praises the cooperation between U.S. law enforcement and intelligence institutions to achieve a secure, “ordered liberty” that respects individual rights.

We acknowledge the ongoing support of the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies in hosting these scholars at BYU. The rapid and large-scale changes in global affairs underscore the importance of having such experienced and insightful speakers on a recurrent basis. We are happy to distribute their collective insights here in written form for the edification of those who strive to understand the world around them.
Present at the Re-Creations of the Trans-Atlantic Community

*The problems in the world are horizontal and all the governments are vertical. How do we solve these problems strictly on a nation-state basis? We don’t.* A lecture by President and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), **John J. Hamre.**

World War II was an astoundingly transformative event. It effectively shattered the international system that had existed for three hundred years. Prior to 1648, there was no international system. The emergence of a truly international system came with the Treaty of Westphalia. That led to the dominance of the European nation-states that extended their power around the world through a series of empires. It was centered in Europe. It was based on empires, the purpose of which was to bring riches back to Europe to make bigger castles for the nobility. It did not benefit people like you and me (although their standard of living was dramatically better than the colonies).

This international system lasted for three hundred years, but it was shattered fundamentally by World War II. The European metropolitan centers were bankrupt. They could not afford to sustain the empires any longer. During the ten years that followed World War II, we saw the end of the empires and the emergence of the modern international state system. Over a hundred countries that previously had been colonies became states in this new international order. The first international system ended, and what emerged was the second international system. That is something we now call the Cold War.

This was an era when the world was divided not really on mercantalist goals but on ideological goals. There was a division between two competing visions of how to organize society and man’s relationship to government. The West was led by the United States. It was an international coalition of countries that believed in a liberal international order based on a rule of law, with the governments responsible to citizens through democratic principles. The East was led by the Soviet Union. It was the international communist bloc that had a very different view on how to organize the world, how to organize society. Fundamentally, they didn’t trust their own citizens.
It wasn’t clear back in 1946 or 1947 who was going to win. There were a great many people in the world who were convinced that the future really should be a communist future, because they looked at how capitalism had destroyed so much during the Great Depression.

This presented two very large challenges to us. One was in the colonial areas. The empires had collapsed, and all of these countries were becoming independent states in the international system. There was a great competition between the East and the West. Were these states going to fall under the control of communism?

The other problem was that World War II divided Europe, with the Russians in the East and the United States, the British, and the French in the West. Very early on, the Soviet Union was starting to install puppet governments in the East and lead a massive army. It was an army that was clearly designed to intimidate Western Europe.

We had to develop a strategy that was going to deal with both of these threats. The centerpiece of this strategy was . . . [the] absolute conviction that American values were superior to the values of international communism. The ideas of freedom and liberty, accountability of government to citizens, accountability of government to a rule of law, the transparency of government activities, the right of the press to publish freely—these are all ideas that sprung out of our Judeo-Christian tradition and were forged and hammered into shape during the European Enlightenment. They became the foundation of our society, and we were convinced that they could also be the values for a new international system. So we put in place a strategy that blended idealism and realism in American foreign policy.

There has always been a bit of tension in American foreign policy. It came together brilliantly in this era. We had to deal with the problem of the Red Army in Europe. We had to create something that was absolutely new for America: we were going to commit to putting military forces permanently overseas. We had never done that before, but we knew we had to here. We had to keep Europe free from military intimidation until the values of the West could win the great competition of ideas. And so we did. We committed, and we built an alliance in Europe which we called NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I must say, when I started off in this business, I never thought I would live long enough to see it end. But we had a conviction for the values underlying our system.
There was such confidence that we had the basic foundation right and that we would succeed over time, never knowing when that would come. I can still remember a magic evening when the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact started to fall apart. [There] was a CNN reporter at the Frankfurt station when a train pulled in. It was probably three in the morning. [The] witless reporter was trying to interview Hungarians stumbling off. He finds someone and says, “Aren’t you tired, aren’t you hungry, aren’t you worried? Is there anything you want to say?”

One of these said, “Yes, there is something I’d like to say. I’d like to thank America for keeping a place in the world that is free.” That is what it was about.

Now, that is our history. It was a brilliant success. It did keep a place in the world that was free. For these new countries that emerged on the world stage that had been colonies before, it gave a pathway to avoid communism as a governing principle and to adopt the values of the West. The centerpiece of this, honestly, was the long partnership that we had with Europe. This is what I would argue is now at stake. If Europe falls apart, we will suffer greatly.

We don’t live in the same era that we did back then. There is no great ideological competition for organizing the world right now. No one is out campaigning to create international communism as the norm for the world. China is not a communist country any longer; it’s the most ruthless capitalist country in the world. They want authoritarian control, but it is not communist. So there is no ideological competition to the West at this stage, and certainly there is no military competitor to the United States.

But we do have very serious issues facing us. We are living in a time when there has been unprecedented change in the world. Good things and bad things can move around the world very quickly. Whether it is international capital flows (which have virtually bankrupted Spain this summer), new ideas (some good ideas, some threatening ideas), migration of people, pollution (there is no border that pollution observes), international trafficking in women, illicit drugs, terrorism—all of these things now move around the world with great ease compared to the past, to be simplistic about it. The problems in the world are horizontal and all the governments are vertical. How do we solve these problems strictly on a nation-state basis? We don’t.

We could not possibly keep pressure on Iran if there were not a global consensus that theirs is a threatening regime doing illegitimate things and that we have to
discipline it through global cooperation and sanctions. This is now how we deal with problems. How do we keep North Korea from selling weapons to renegade states in the world? This now requires cooperation on an unprecedented scale, beyond our reach. We work with lots of people, but no one is more important to us than Europe, because Europe is willing to shoulder the burden with us to establish the international institutions that establish the norm of the day. If Europe collapses, we will be far the worse for it. It will set back our interests.

Why does it matter? Why would you young people here in Utah have an interest in the health and well-being of the European Union? Because it will directly affect your own well-being over time. Fundamentally, we still have a need to sustain this global system that is based on Western values: democracy, freedom, responsibility of government, transparency, rule of law—all of these things that are the foundation for the success of our country. We do need Europe to be our partner going forward. The success of the international system, and certainly our well-being, are tied to it directly.

The lecture abridged here was originally delivered at the Europe in a Nutshell conference at Brigham Young University on September 27, 2012. It was co-sponsored by the Center for the Study of Europe.
Islam: Truth and Beauty

Islamic art is like a non-polemical theology of metaphysics. It is silent theology. It speaks much more eloquently than polemical discourses. A lecture by George Washington University Professor of Islamic Studies Seyyed Hossein Nasr.

No authentic expression of the truth is ever separated from beauty. Everything that is true is beautiful, including the human soul, the highest work of art of God. When it is truthful, there is beauty in the soul. In Arabic it is quite interesting that the word for goodness, virtue, and beauty is the same. Ugliness is a human invention. We have the choice of making that which is ugly and that which is beautiful, starting with ourselves. This is a very important truth to realize, even across the boundaries of Islam.

There is no religion in which the expression of authentic truth is not combined with beauty. This remarkable wedding between the sacred and beauty is universal. Throughout history, religious truth has spoken to human beings more through the language of beauty than through the language of abstract thought—of theology and of philosophy. I shall whittle down my comments to the case of Islamic tradition.

What is the truth? Maa al-haqiqah? The question has been asked throughout Islamic history going back to the time of the Prophet. The Qur’an, the sacred scripture of Islam, is essentially a document that is concerned with the truth. Again you have this wedding between truth and beauty. There are a billion and a half Muslims in the world today who have never experienced the Qur’an outside of either beautiful sound or beautiful form. You see beautiful calligraphy on buildings, at home, or in books. They read it themselves or they hear it. In the Islamic experience, truth always appears in the dress of beauty. It is impossible for Islam to survive as a religion without beauty; beauty is and has been the hallmark of everything Islamic throughout history.

Truth means that, first of all, there is a God. This is the heart of the truth of Islam. All of this is contained in a single sentence—laa ilaaha illa allah—there is no reality (or there is no divinity) but the divine reality, which is a formula of oneness but also a formula of returning everything back to God. One of the names of God is One, Allah. A second is All Powerful. Yet another name of God that is central is The Beautiful, Jameel. According to the famous saying of the proverb of Islam, God is beautiful, and He loves beauty. In the same way that God, being good, wants us to perform good acts;
God, being beautiful, wants us both to be beautiful and to make beautifully. This is the spiritual foundation of Islamic art.

In most places where Islamic art is taught, it is always considered an art that developed in a strange way in the Middle East, based on Sassanid, Byzantine, and other influences. I believe this is a total disregard for the truth. Sacred art is always divinely inspired art. Every civilization is like this, and Islam is no exception. What Islamic art comes from is what they call the *Haqiqah*—the inner truth of the Qur’an.

In a universal sense, truth has no boundary. I am now speaking in English, and I used the word “true,” which comes from an Anglo-Saxon. Or you could use the word *veritas*, coming from Latin. If I were speaking Arabic or Persian I would say, *Haqq*, or *Haqiiqaha*. The boundaries are linguistic whereas the concepts are universal. When you get to the domain of art, the form itself becomes much more particularized, like the form of language. It is the inner meaning that is universal and universalized.

Each expression of the truth below God (who is the absolute truth) is an expression of truth in the form of various revelations and various religions, which also brings with it a particular understanding of the hierarchy of art. What is universal in the hierarchy of art of all religions—all traditions from Taoism to Judaism—is that the highest form of the art is the art that deals with God—that is, sacred, the Tao, the absolute reality, or however you want to name it. In Islam, the highest expression of the truth is not a person; it is the word of the Qur’an. So the first great sacred art of Islam at the top of the hierarchy of the arts, correspondent to the Christian icon, is calligraphy.

The second great art in Islamic civilization is related very much to the first. That is architecture. It says in the *hadith* of the Prophet where God addresses a part of Islam: “Verily, I make for thee the whole of the earth thy mosque.” I say this because, in a sense, Islam did not need architecture until they came out of nature into the cities. Otherwise, nature is God’s architecture. Once we began to build, we destroyed the sacred quality of natural space. It was therefore necessary to create a sacred space. That is how the mosque architecture began. They vary from simple mud structures in Mali or Chad to the Sultan Ahmed Mosque in Istanbul or the Shah Mosque in Isfahan.

These two remain within the classic arts as the peak of the hierarchy of Islamic arts. They have remained at the peak because of the particular expression of the truth in its Islamic form. MuHii al-diin ibn ‘Arabii, the great Andalucian sage, writes in one of
his books: “For Muslims, it is forbidden to depict the image of the divinity. Let us not criticize Christians for whom these depictions were allowed by another dispensation from God.” Even the Hagia Sophia, which was a mosque for such a long time, still has a tremendous painting of Christ on the ceiling. They didn’t tear it down. Truth itself ordered the Muslims to also respect other expressions of truth that are not Islamic. Even the Hindu idols that appear as polytheism, looked at more profoundly, represent another hierarchy of the arts, another way in which God speaks to humanity.

In the sonoral arts, the peak of the artistic hierarchy of Islam is, of course, the solemnity of the Qur’an—the chanting of the Qur’an. This is an art that Muslims claim is ultimately derived from an art that God taught to the prophet David. It is claimed that the Gregorian chant, a method of chanting of the Qur’an, ultimately goes back to the same source as music. As Muslims, because of what is said in our traditional Islamic sources, we believe that the prophet taught Muslims how to chant the Qur’an. For the Muslim ear, that is the highest form of music.

I want to say a few words about the relation between truth and beauty. To those who have said there is no symbolism in Islamic art, I disagree completely. “Symbol,” originally in Greek, comes from the word symbolon, which means to tie and to bind. A symbol is what binds a lower order of reality to a higher order of reality. How curious that its opposite is the diabol, the diabolic, which separates the two states, the two realities, from each other. Islamic art, by definition either reminds you of God or it is not Islamic art.

Islamic art is an aniconic art. Symbolism with Islamic art comes through other ways. First of all with nothing—through the void. Islamic architecture is defined by emptiness. The immediate experience of the sacred space of the mosque is emptiness. This has a very profound metaphysical significance. If this world is something, God is nothing. In reverse, God is everything, God is absolute reality, and the world is nothing. The genius of Islamic art is in the second choice, of bringing out something of the evanescence, of the nothingness and the brutalness of the world before God. The void to the Muslim is not simply lack; it is presence, where absence of this world is the presence of God.

Then we come to what we call “positive forms” in Islamic art. All sacred arts use geometry. There is no sacred art in the world that is openly as geometrical as Islamic art.
Geometric forms in the arabesque are like a wedding of the masculine and feminine by unity, through which God has created the world. As the Qur’an says: “Verily, we created you in pairs.”

Islamic art is like a non-polemical theology of metaphysics. It is silent theology. It speaks much more eloquently than polemical discourses. In a country like France (where Islamophobia is at its peak and there are attacks against Muslims almost every day), when there is a concert of authentic Persian or Arabic music, you could not get a ticket. It is always full. I am not belittling the importance of religious discourse or theological discussions, but as a humble student of Islamic art, I think an exhibition like this\(^1\) essentially speaks more eloquently than ten speakers could about the subject. We have to learn to attune our ears to the voice of silence. We can only do that when we also become better human beings—not only vis-à-vis Islamic tradition, but vis-à-vis our own.

\begin{quote}
The lecture abridged here was originally delivered at the Wheatley Institution at Brigham Young University on September 6, 2012. It was co-sponsored by the College of Fine Arts and Communications, and the Brigham Young University Museum of Art.
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\(^1\) Dr. Nasr refers to \textit{Beauty and Belief: Crossing Bridges with the Arts of Islamic Culture}. The exhibition was in Brigham Young University’s Museum of Art from February to September 2012.
Great leaps forward in political science often take place when someone sees puzzles where others are only seeing facts. A lecture by Princeton University Professor of International Affairs Robert O. Keohane.

Viewed historically, you are in distinguished company. Aristotle was probably the first systematic Western political scientist, theorizing the relationship of politics to other spheres of life and creating a typology of regimes. He created what we would now call comparative politics. Machiavelli not only advised the Prince but sought to analyze the nature of leadership. Montesquieu and Madison developed a durable theory of constitutionalism, and Tocqueville put forth insights into the nature of democracy that remain vibrant today. In the generation of political scientists born in the first three decades of this century, Gabriel Almond, Robert Dahl, Elinor Ostrom, and Kenneth Waltz all profoundly affected our knowledge of politics. If you decide to go on, to join in the political science profession and become a graduate student and then a faculty member in it, you are joining a vibrant profession with a rich history.

What, then, is political science? I would define politics as involving attempts to organize human groups, to determine internal rules, and externally to compete and cooperate with other organized groups. I will define science as a publicly known set of procedures designed to make and evaluate descriptive and causal inferences on the basis of the self-conscious application of methods that are themselves subject to public evaluation. Most of my lecture will be devoted to an explication of how, in my view, political science should be carried out—that is, the process of thinking and research that yields insights into politics.

I want to begin by talking about teaching. When we look around, we see that virtually all top-ranked political scientists in the world today are active teachers. In my view, there is a reason for this. Teaching undergraduates compels one to put arguments into ordinary language accessible to undergraduates and, therefore, to smart people who have not absorbed the arcane language of social science, which can be evasive as well as it can be illuminating. Teaching graduate students exposes one to new ideas from younger and more supple minds, as long as the students are sufficiently critical of the
professor’s views. Never disparage teaching. It is an intrinsic part of political science as a vocation.

What is the process that political scientists go through in their search for knowledge? Interesting work begins, in my view, not just with a problem but with a puzzle. Puzzles are anomalies: what we have observed does not fit with our preconceptions based on established theory. Great leaps forward in political science often take place when someone sees puzzles where others are only seeing facts. It is important to begin with an interesting puzzle where the answer is not obvious.

After you have a puzzle, the next step is conceptualization and being clear about the meaning of concepts. Whether civil wars are becoming more or less frequent may turn on how we conceptualize what is a civil war rather than a lesser form of civil conflict. There are no right or wrong definitions, but there are explicit and implicit definitions. The more definitions conform to ordinary usage, the less confusion is likely to result.

Now I come to description and interpretation. For example, from known facts, such as that each of 150 countries has a different form of government and economic characteristics, we may infer that there is a correlation between wealth and democracy. Properly speaking, such a conclusion rests on a chain of inferences. It is often necessary to probe those. When states “reject” a public offer, as Spain has rejected loan terms from the European Central Bank, are they really rejecting it entirely, or are they establishing a bargaining position? Political scientists engage in interpretation all the time.

Now causal inference. Causality necessarily involves consideration of a counterfactual situation. If Charles II had not been executed in 1649, would Great Britain have a different political system now? If nuclear weapons had not been invented, would the United States and the Soviet Union have fought World War III in the 1950s? You always infer causality, and it is always a problematic or uncertain inference. Unfortunately for science (but probably fortunately for the human race), we cannot manipulate large-scale political phenomena for our convenience, even if human subjects committees would allow us to do so. So on these issues, our causal inferences are always likely to be problematic. We could not construct a French Revolution for the treatment and have no French Revolution be the placebo.
So why choose political science as a vocation? If causal inferences and predictions in our field are as intractable as I have argued, why should we choose our profession? My short answer is that we study politics not because it is beautiful or easy to understand, but because it is so important to all fields of human endeavor. Without a vibrant political science, leaders would be guided only by their limited personal experiences, historical analogies, and folk wisdom—all highly unreliable as a basis for inference. Publics would be deprived of a scientific basis for criticism. If we are doing our job, we political scientists will be irritating to political leaders since we illuminate their deliberate obscurities and deceptions, point to alternative policies that could be followed, question their motivations, and dissect the operations of organizations that support them and the governments over which they preside.

In conclusion, let me express the hope that younger political scientists will see openings where we older political scientists see closure and that you have ideas about how to move through those openings to the insights that surely lie behind them.

The lecture abridged here was originally delivered at the Wheatley Institution at Brigham Young University on September 20, 2012. It was co-sponsored by the Political Science Department.
RELIGION AND DIPLOMACY

Where strong political passions exist, anyone can be a terrorist. Regardless of the cause, though, religion can often offer a powerful antidote, if properly engaged. A WIAC introduction by President of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, Douglas M. Johnston.

If one had to convey a single message to U.S. foreign policy practitioners, it would be that religion matters. For good or for ill, the world is growing increasingly religious. What’s more, the nature of religion in many places is changing; it is becoming more dynamic, more activist, and more political. While the majority of religious movements are peaceful, some errant ideologies are at work justifying and encouraging violence. These ideologies must be countered, and countered effectively. Military force is clearly an asset in the fight against religious extremism, but it can never fully protect us from the type of terrorist assaults that have taken place over the past decade. Ideologies must be countered with ideas, and ideologies steeped in religion need to be challenged on religious grounds.

These days, in almost any foreign policy situation, ignoring the motivating influence of religious faith is a sure recipe for failure. Because so many terrorists, like those that struck the United States on 9/11, derive their legitimacy from extremist interpretations of their religion, the most effective counter is to empower the more tolerant, mainstream beliefs of that religion, especially among those communities most at risk of succumbing to violent propaganda. Although radical Islam is at the forefront of most religious conversations today, the lessons to be learned from combating extremism in an Islamic context apply equally well to any conflict having a religious dimension to it.

At latest count, some 86% of the world’s seven billion inhabitants identify themselves as members of a religious community. It may be fair to say that it is in the nature of things that humans instinctively aspire to a higher order of things. To ignore the motivating influence of religious ideas and not have a sympathetic understanding of those who identify strongly with the dictates of their faith would be to handicap

ourselves severely in dealing with today’s geopolitical realities. Religious political parties are becoming increasingly influential in North Africa and the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring, as they are in other conflicts in the region and in the current political evolution in Turkey. Similar tendencies are also being experienced in the West where Muslims have been migrating in large numbers and reshaping public attitudes and government policies in the process. This suggests that any effective long-term strategy to counter extremism should seek to capitalize on religion’s extensive reach as well as its ethical values.

By the same token, it is important not to over-generalize in ascribing religious motives to all extremist activities. Terrorism has long been used by people of various cultures for various reasons, primarily to achieve political aims. More than 95% of all known cases of suicide bombings between 1980 and 2004 had clear political objectives. Whether in Chechnya or Sri Lanka, Kashmir or Gaza, the goals were always political and, more often than not, related to expelling an occupying force.

It is also the case that those who committed these bombings came from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. Between 1982 and 1986, Hezbollah carried out 41 suicide attacks against Israeli, American, and French targets in Lebanon. Of these, only eight were carried out by Islamic extremists, 27 by members of secular leftist political groups such as the Lebanese Communist Party, and three by Christians. All those involved were born in Lebanon and adhered to diverse, if not totally divergent, ideologies. More recently, the anarchy and bloodshed that ensued in Iraq following the U.S. invasion was motivated by political competition between the Shiite and Sunni militias in a bid for power.

Thus it is that the overriding motivation in most long-term, large-scale terrorist activities is political rather than religious. Where strong political passions exist, anyone can be a terrorist. Regardless of the cause, though, religion can often offer a powerful antidote, if properly engaged. All of the major world religions share core tenets about neighborly concern and the betterment of humanity, tenets that under the right circumstances can be used to bridge differences between adversaries. The 2014 WIAC

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4 Pape, Robert A. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. (New York: Random House, 2005). (Raw data available at the archive for the Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism, housed at the University of Chicago.)
will explore the potential of commonly-held religious values to serve as the basis for a faith-based component to traditional diplomacy that can assist in countering extremist tendencies.

*Dr. Johnston penned these remarks to introduce the topic of the 2014 Wheatley International Affairs Conference, to be held in February of that year.*
As America Pivots: Trends and Opportunities in the Asia-Pacific Region

The biggest threat to China is China, dealing with their own youth, managing a generation that has only seen the pie get bigger every year. A lecture by President of the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ralph A. Cossa.

President Obama actually never used the term “pivot.” The Pentagon hates it—they would rather say “reassess” or “rebalance”—but the press loves it because it’s simple. The reality is that the only thing new about the strategy is the term “pivot.” The reassessment, the refocus on Asia, goes back to the Bush administration—the George H. W. Bush administration in 1989, with the end of the Cold War. It was a recognition that the twenty-first century would be the Asia century, that America had to focus its attention there because of the rising security challenges but also the rising economic and political opportunities, the transformations that were underway in Asia.

As we try to swing toward Asia, we keep hitting the Middle East and getting stuck there. Certainly Iraq and Afghanistan have occupied a lot of our time, energy, and treasure over the past eight years or so. Now, the administration is trying to once again focus on Asia. The need to stress that America is back is due to concerns in Asia about American commitment and American staying power.

There are a lot of concerns today as Asians and others watch the rise of China, but also as they see the decline of the United States. Not in our military power—we’re still second to none. Not even really in our economic power—we still have an economy four times the size of China. The decline is in our political image. There are some countries in Asia that want us there because of our military power. Everyone wants us, likes us, or at least tolerates us because of our economic power. It is the soft power that is the challenge. Whereas you can point to countries that are the challenge to our hard power or to our economic power, the only challenge to our soft power is us—ourselves. We challenge it by failing to live up to our ideals, by not promoting the right things, and by saying one thing and pursuing another.

Let me talk about five major trends and challenges. One is the growing importance of Southeast Asia and ASEAN. Southeast Asia is an area that is incredibly important to us. We invest three times as much money—direct foreign investment from
the United States—in Southeast Asia than we do in China, ten times as much as we do in India. The big challenge a couple of years ago is an opportunity today. That is Burma, which we will soon be calling Myanmar. Are they going to become a Jeffersonian democracy? Probably not in my lifetime, and maybe not in yours, but the leaders there have caught on that their own policies are self-destructive. They have made the decision to try to move forward.

We then step back one step and look at the broader Asia-Pacific cooperation. ASEAN is just Southeast Asia—just those ten countries. We are part of a broader framework of cooperation within the Asia-Pacific community. There is the ASEAN Regional Forum. There is also APEC. Then you have the new East Asia Summit, which is bringing together all of the countries of Asia along with Australia, New Zealand, India, the United States, and Russia. This will be the real important multilateral setting of the future. We will be working in that direction.

One of the things that these organizations have been trying to focus on now is the counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, something that has been very important and very high on the U.S. agenda. Four years ago, during the presidential elections, the only issue that the two candidates agreed on was that the greatest threat to the United States came from weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of non-state actors. At some point in this dialogue of reducing nuclear weapons, you have to bring the Chinese on board. The Chinese are the key actor.

We, of course, have the problem with North Korea. North Korea without nuclear weapons is the Congo without jewels. It’s a completely failed state. The North Koreans are not in a big rush to give up these nuclear weapons. It’s their only marketing chip. We have a pretty hard challenge in front of us, dealing with it. Our quid pro quo is to try to open up the North Korean society, to ultimately create an Arab Spring in North Korea, to recreate what happened in Eastern Europe years ago as people became more aware.

People are starving in North Korea. Starving people don’t overthrow governments. Starving people starve. People that overthrow governments are the rising middle class, the ones that see that things could be and should be better. Those are the people we are starting to reach out to in North Korea. The real key is that we maintain a lockstep between the U.S. and South Korea. We have been able to do that for the last four years, but there are elections coming up—not just in the United States but in South
Korea—this fall. The elections in South Korea could have a greater impact on U.S.
foreign policy in Northeast Asia than the elections in the United States.

North Korea, for the United States and for China, is a part-time job. President
Obama wakes up in the morning, and the last thing on his mind is dealing with North
Korea. When Kim Jong-un wakes up in the morning, the first thing on his mind is, “How
do I survive? How do I play the U.S. against China and against Russia?” We’re dealing
with them on a part-time basis while their full-time job is figuring out how they can play
us. They are very good at it.

U.S.-China relations have been very difficult and very sensitive. China has had
remarkable success. The Chinese miracle is based in part on very hard work and very
skillful management by the Chinese, but it is also built on American, Japanese, and
Western direct foreign investment. It has created an interdependence, which gives us
mutually assured economic destruction. That is the same tack we took toward Germany
and Japan after World War II. It worked, by the way. They are both very close friends
and allies. Some of us can remember when that wasn’t the case. Ultimately, I believe
that will work with China as well.

By the way, Japan is still the third richest nation on earth. We shouldn’t
overestimate the Chinese or underestimate Japan. The strongest navy in the Pacific by
far, outside of the American navy, is still the Japanese navy. If you are choosing up sides
for a war game, you’re going to choose the Japanese first, you’re going to choose the
Koreans second, and there are a couple others you might consider before you want to
bring the Chinese in on your team. That is not to say China does not represent a
challenge.

The biggest threat to China is China. It’s dealing with their own youth, dealing
with a group of 20- and 30-somethings. That is the real challenge to China internally—
managing this among a generation that has never seen anything but the pie getting
bigger every year. I don’t lose a lot of sleep, quite frankly, about China surpassing the
United States any time in my lifetime—certainly not economically, certainly not
politically, and certainly not in soft power. There may be countries in Asia that say,
“Boy, I wish that my government were as rich as the Chinese government,” but no one
wakes up in the morning and says, “Boy, I wish my government would treat me the way
the Chinese treat their people.” That is American soft power. That is Japanese and South Korean soft power.

The final point I’ll make is on Northeast Asia cooperation. We have been trying to do this ad hoc thing called the Six-Party Talks. It has been aimed primarily at trying to denuclearize North Korea, which, in my view, is not going to happen any time soon. What we really need to focus on is containing them and opening them up. But all of this is based on the solid foundation of U.S. alliances with Japan, with South Korea, with Australia, and with the Philippines and Thailand. Every Asia speech by every president during my lifetime has started off by talking about the importance of our Asia alliances, our relationships, and continuing to build and grow those. As long as we continue to do that, I think we’re going to be in good shape as far as our relationships with Asia go. I think we are going to see Asia moving in the right direction, which will serve their purposes well and will serve our purposes well.

_The lecture abridged here was originally delivered at the Wheatley International Affairs Conference for undergraduate students on March 14, 2012._
America's Strategic Challenges in the Middle East and Central Asia

The Middle East is at war with itself more than it is at war with us. There is no reason to expect that it’s going to calm down. A lecture by retired United States Army General and former Commander of the United States Central Command, John P. Abizaid.

What keeps us so involved in the Middle East? What are the dynamics at play in this particular part of the world that cause us to spend billions of dollars and the lives of our young men and women in combat there, combat that has been going on for the past nine years and will continue to go on for a while?

The Middle East is a complicated place. It is, in many respects, at war with itself more than it is at war with us. The home of the three great religions on earth—Christianity, Judaism, and Islam—can never seem to settle down. [It has] 5,000 years of history punctuated with lots of violence. There is no reason to expect, as we look 5,000 years ahead, that it’s going to calm down.

For the last nine years we have been fighting there in very difficult circumstances, trying to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a difficult part of the world where the main religion of the region, Islam, is trying to come to grips with its future in this globalizing planet of ours. Do they have to reform their culture in a way that allows them to be more resilient against the threats that they see coming from places such as the United States, Western Europe, and the other developing countries around them? Their struggle trying to understand where they are is not unlike the struggle that Christianity went through in the Reformation period.

There are four major strategic issues at play of which we need to have some general understanding. First and foremost, the one that I think is the most difficult for us to grasp, sometimes the most uncomfortable for us to even talk about, is the rise of Sunni Islamic extremism. This ideology of Islamic extremism, as exemplified by Al Qaeda, is something that we need to pay close attention to. They want us to leave the region so that they can come to grips with what they regard as the illegitimate leadership of the Islamic nations in the region. They will defeat them once we depart. They will put their ideology in place. The extremists’ ideology will become ascendant. In their own
way, despite the tactics that they use, they are courageous, they are organized, they are determined, they are ferocious, and they will stop at nothing to achieve their aims.

Never before has there been a movement without a geographic base, without a nation-state behind it, that has managed to exert such military activity on the planet. It is a deadly movement, and it is one that almost none of us really know much about or have bothered to study. What does it look like in practice? Well, people can come to the soccer stadiums to see executions. Music is banned. Women are excluded from the society. The Qur’an is so strictly interpreted that life is joyless, but people turn to this in desperation and out of a sense of hopelessness that their governments can provide the services and security that they need for a better future.

The good news is that the vast majority of Muslims do not want this ideology to become ascendant. The challenge for us, as we face the ideology, is not only how to protect ourselves, but how to help the people in the region help themselves against this very difficult challenge.

Number two is Shia Islamic extremism, which is completely opposed to Sunni Islamic extremism. Shia Islamic extremism is exemplified by the rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the revolutionary government that came to power there in 1979. There is no doubt whatsoever in my mind that they want to develop a nuclear weapon because their ultimate goal is to be the number one power in the most important economic area on earth: the Persian Gulf. They must push American power out of the region in order to establish an area in which they can operate and achieve their hegemonic ambitions.

Issue number three is the continued corrosive effect of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This conflict between Israelis and Palestinians creates a dynamic that causes people to lose faith that the middle will hold. They start to move towards the extremes. For the Muslims, sometimes the extremes mean moving towards organizations such as Al Qaeda, or moving towards nations such as Iran, for support and direction. For the Israelis, it means constant harassment, suicide bombing, and difficulty within the area that they hope to live in. It is important that the corrosion of the Arab-Israeli conflict be taken off the broader table of conflict in the Middle East if we are to move forward positively in the 21st century.

The fourth strategic dynamic . . . [is] the continued reliance of the global economy on Middle Eastern oil. This over-reliance puts us in a position to have to react to almost
every geopolitical threat that is caused by the various nation-states in the region. In fact, it causes us to react quicker, with more power than we would if something happened in Europe, Africa, or Asia.

There are some accelerants that can make all of these very bad very quickly if we don’t pay attention to them. One of the most important accelerants is the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region. Nuclear weapons in an inherently unstable area, where terrorism is endemic, create a dynamic for a potential larger-scale nation-state nuclear showdown as weapons proliferate to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and the other larger countries in the region. Nuclear weapons in unstable states, such as Pakistan and potentially Iran, create a dynamic where our worst nightmare can be true: that they would use a weapon against our interests, our allies, or our country.

What is it that we have to do? How should we behave in the region? Ultimately, we have to do what we have started to do in both Iraq and Afghanistan and take the only logical course for us, which is to arm the great, good people of the region against this ideology. But at the same time, we can’t let up the pressure on these terrorist nodes. It’s not just about staying or leaving; it’s about finding a path forward that continues to suppress the terrorist activity and moves towards their eventual dissolution because they no longer have a friendly sea in which to swim. It does not mean hundreds of thousands of troops for hundreds of years, but it does mean a commitment of American force, American prestige, and American power in an affordable way against these extremist nodes.

You will not ever hear me say, “It’s time to go to war with Iran.” No soldier that I know of has ever looked for war. We should not reach for our weapons before we have allowed diplomacy, economic activity, intelligence activity, and educational activity to work through the problems that are clear within Iran.

Iran is a divided place. The majority of the people don’t like the government. Given time, the government will fall to a very rich and very capable culture that doesn’t like the suppression that it has felt under this Iranian leadership. It is important for us to figure out how to enable that movement without having to go to war with Iran. It is important that we work with our friends and allies in the region to contain their power, that we look for ways to help the legitimate resistance of the Iranian people get rid of the government that no longer responds to their desires and wishes.
It is about time that we figure out how to reduce our dependence on Middle Eastern oil—through conservation, through new discoveries, through new technologies, through whatever means we need—because to continue to be held in the handcuffs of geopolitical action that essentially sets the tempo for our activity in the region is no longer making any sense.

We can no longer contemplate unconstrained resource spending, nor can we contemplate that we won’t have competition. Competition is rising in China; competition is rising in other parts of the planet. In this new relationship, where we move from hyper-power to power, we are going to have to find out how to work with other powers in a responsible way.

Not only have I fought half my life in the Middle East, but so have my son, my son-in-law, and my daughter. It is my hope that his kids, my grandkids, won’t have to face combat in the Middle East. But unless we take these challenges seriously and find realistic ways to form a strategy that is not dependent on the two-year congressional cycle but on the long-term interests of our country, then we are in for more and rougher seas. I have only the greatest confidence in our ability to shoulder these burdens and to solve these problems, if first we take the time to understand; second, take the time to be involved; and third, get behind the efforts necessary to be successful, not only there but at home.

_The lecture abridged here was originally delivered at the Wheatley Institution at Brigham Young University on November 11, 2010._
Managing Intelligence and Security in Today’s World: America’s Response

Ordered liberty is the name of the game in the United States, and throughout our history, with very few exceptions, we have adhered to it. A lecture by former FBI Director, Director of Central Intelligence, and federal judge, William H. Webster.

We have learned how to manage our troops in wars away from home. We have learned about command and control, all branches and sectors. But it seems to me that at home, we have been somewhat slow to achieve the level of security that we need. There is a tremendous need for fusion. I want to talk about the evolution of levels of cooperation on our part over the past thirty years.

In 1978, when I was sworn in at the FBI, then-Vice President Mondale gave me two printed reports. The bottom line for those two reports was that the FBI and the CIA were in each other’s way; they should not be spending so much time together. “CIA, you go overseas; FBI, you stay here. Don’t do too much talking to each other because you might have to give up that information to a defense counsel in criminal cases.” In 1980, we were experiencing a hundred terrorist incidents a year and I decided to make terrorism one of the top priorities of the FBI. When I left in 1987 to go to the CIA, we were down from 100 incidents a year to six. In the next year, there were none. Most essentially, we did it by understanding that we had to know where the problem was coming from. These early steps have proved the importance of cooperation at all levels of government.

One cannot prevent something from happening unless good intelligence advises that something is going to happen and you have the means to do something about it. The problem is that security is always too much until the day it’s not enough. That is a very big challenge for people who work in the area that I am talking about tonight: to know how much security is needed, to supply it, to explain it, and to have the support and understanding of the American people in the process, but not to overdo it.

I’ve been excited to see the evolution of the counterterrorism centers, counterintelligence centers, and counternarcotics centers, which have emerged to bring information together collectively. Needless to say—and this is not a knock-on-wood statement—if you ask how many 9/11’s there have been since nine years ago, it is
reassuring to know that men and women are working twenty-four hours, around the clock, to see that we don’t have another one, that we are going to be able to successfully defend against it. After 9/11, we decided we had to do something here at home to reflect the threats from outside. We created a Department of Homeland Security, which we did not have in the past. We started with 180,000 people. There are 200,000 people now learning to work together who had not worked together in the past, and I think they are doing a good job of it.

The Homeland Security Advisory Council was created to bring in outside people with experience and judgment who were not part of the regular government, but who might see beyond bureaucratic obstacles and make recommendations. Over 300 reports by our Homeland Security Advisory Council members have gone to the Secretary, most of which have been incorporated—either with or without official orders—into a better organized and better assimilated department. I would like to think that this will continue and be an active contribution to the security of our country.

The fusion centers are working fine. You have sheriffs, chiefs of police, and federal investigative officials sitting down and going over the materials. With the technological capabilities for it, increased sharing is taking place. The Patriot Act, when it came out after 9/11, prescribed a shift from “need-to-know”—which is what I grew up with, where as few people as possible know something that is secret—to “need-to-share.” If you look at the track record to see what has happened in the last nine years, you have to say that we must be doing something right.

One of the things that we are doing with our experts, with those who can give us some help, is to try to understand what is changing about all this. What is the nature of this threat? Is it an Islamic threat, or is it a threat of people who happen to be Muslims who are engaging in extremism and radicalizing themselves? There is a little of both; we are trying to understand it rationally and to come up with solutions that will help, but increasing violence is very much a possibility. It’s not just going in terms of terrorism, per se. There are other things that affect us, things like the southwest border and the issues with Mexico. 11,000 people have been killed on the border on their side; when will it come to our side?

What other kinds of threats are out there? One of them is what I call, “The Lone Wolf Syndrome.” We saw that in the shooting at Fort Hood. We are finding that many
people on their own are dissatisfied with circumstances and angry, and often going outside of the country with modern technology to consult people. We are going to have to be more aware that these things are going on.

We have been doing some studies and providing some thoughts and recommendations on what you might call “suspicious” activity. The motto now of Homeland Security is: “See something, tell someone.” You remember the recent firebombing of the car in Times Square, which could have been a very serious event. But a vendor, who normally, in the past, would not have called the police about anything, called the police and told them what he saw and they were able to get there in time to stop it. They were able to work with the person responsible, and that investigation is going along very successfully because somebody saw something and told somebody about it.

I remember my own experience some years ago when it was reported that outside a van, a group of joggers had gathered together. The person who called in to the FBI thought what was unusual about the group of joggers in jogging suits outside the van was they were all smoking! They called us. We thought that was significant enough to look at, and we were able to get out and find that this group was engaged in terrorist activities. We confiscated the materials and arrested those involved because one good citizen thought it was strange enough that he would tell somebody about it. You, as American citizens, are involved in that responsibility. If you see something like this, you really ought to tell somebody.

We have good working relationships now with these massive intelligence centers at the federal level. I am convinced that things are going along at a very satisfactory rate. We are going to try to keep on improving our ability to work aggressively against these potential major attacks against our country, and at the same time do it within the framework of our constitution. I have confidence in the American people to participate in this, and I’m convinced that, if properly collected and administered, we can connect the dots and find successful means of preventing the crimes that are potentially horrendous.

Edmund Burke, a great Irish statesman, stood up in London 200 years ago and talked about what I now call “ordered liberty.” Not only could you have it, but you couldn’t survive without it. I think of that many times when people are suggesting that
some of the activities that we engage in for security reasons seem to infringe on individual liberties. We must find that balance, and we must be sensitive to it, but ordered liberty is the name of the game in the United States, and throughout our history, with very few exceptions, we have adhered to it. We don’t say that those who do these sensitive and sometimes intrusive things in the interest of your national security should have a free hand without being accountable. What we do ask is that those who have the oversight exercise it responsibly, carefully, on your behalf, and make the judgment: is it legal, is it necessary, and will it help preserve freedom?

I have been impressed by my experience with those who have had the benefit of an education at this university. I think it must be, in a way, why we have so many FBI agents with LDS backgrounds. Their values are the same. Your fidelity to our country and to our constitution, the bravery that you have exhibited from the day that Brigham Young set out to find the right place for people to live in peace and to worship as they chose to do, and the integrity that I have always found in the men and women who have had the benefit of your religious training and faith, make us very fortunate to have so many in the FBI. Fidelity, bravery and integrity: these are the tools by which we manage security, good intelligence, and safety.

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